Brazil vs. Japan: How Japan can exploit the main weakness of Brazil's new defence at World Cup 2026

Brazil wrapped up the group stage of the World Cup by beating Scotland 3-0 and topping Group C. As a result, the Selecao will face Japan, runners-up in Group F, in the last 32, next Monday June 29 at 7pm UK time.

Drawing the Japanese in the bracket has split opinion: on one hand, there was relief at not facing the Netherlands; on the other, concern given how tactically tricky the matchup is and the fact that it already ended in a Brazilian defeat in a friendly last year.

Even with crucial absentees, Japan did not lose a single game in the group stage and, given the way they line up and build their play, they could exploit what is arguably the main weakness of Carlo Ancelotti's new Brazil defence.

The defensive shift that helped Brazil at the World Cup

Brazil's opener against Morocco showed a team that struggled to create against a low, compact block, but also a team with defensive issues. The 1-1 draw came thanks to a Moroccan goal that emerged from a failure in Brazil's counter-press, but also exposed a key flaw in Ancelotti's standard 4-4-2.

The Italian had previously stressed that the Selecao would defend in a 4-4-2 and that would not change. In the opener, that shape exposed problems, particularly involving Casemiro. As one of the players in the middle line, the holding midfielder had to cover a lot of ground laterally during pressing situations, and his physical profile no longer allows for that to be done easily.

That is how Morocco exploited the space. They found a diagonal pass moving from the left, where Brazil's press was based, into the middle. Casemiro had to cover a lot of ground to chase Brahim Diaz, who received the ball unmarked, and arrived too late. There was also confusion with Douglas Santos about who would jump out to press the ball, and the number 10 had the time and space to provide the assist.

However, Brazil changed the way they defended in the win against Haiti and consolidated it against Scotland. It was the first run of games in which Ancelotti kept the same pattern since he arrived more than a year ago - and, were it not for Raphinha's injury, he would have repeated the starting eleven, too. But to do so, he contradicted himself: he abandoned the standard 4-4-2.

Against Scotland, it became even clearer that Brazil were now defending in a 4-1-3-2, leaving Casemiro behind a trio of dynamic midfielders to focus the team's pressing in midfield. That was the key to their success against the Scots:

Vinicius Junior and Rayan, the front two, channelled Scotland's build-up centrally by closing off passing lanes from the centre-backs to the full-backs;

With the wide options shut off, Scotland had to try to play through the middle, where Brazil had more players on the heels of their opponents;

That made the pass from the centre-back to the holding midfielder risky, for example, as that player had a Brazilian midfielder pressing his back;

More than that, it also created doubt for the centre-back: was it positive to play through the middle under that kind of pressure? Should he go long or play back to the goalkeeper? That hesitation cost the player on the ball crucial fractions of a second for Vinicius or Rayan to press - and that was how Brazil's first goal of the night came about.

That structural change allowed Casemiro to operate as a 'watchdog' behind two earlier lines of pressing, which removed his responsibility to cover long distances. The holding midfielder then became more of a protector of the back line. Combined with the idea of setting a pressing trap through the middle, Brazil enjoyed plenty of success.

Why facing Japan this way could be dangerous for Brazil

This defensive 4-1-3-2, however, has its gaps. The central idea of the system is to invite the opposition to build up through the middle to press them with numerical superiority - theoretically simple, but it also demands commitment, particularly from the front two.

Vinicius had good moments in funnelling Scotland's build-up, particularly early on - the period of the highest defensive contribution from the number seven during games. But he is plainly the weak link in the system without the ball.

On several occasions, Vinicius would jog ahead of Scotland's build-up without putting pressure on the player in possession. He allowed passes both centrally and out wide, and Scotland had chances to play out from the flanks with numerical superiority precisely because of that.

Ancelotti's 4-1-3-2 is strong through the middle but leaves significant gaps out wide - and that is precisely why the idea is to close them. With Vinicius allowing the ball to come out wide, Scotland enjoyed numerical superiority with a full-back, holding midfielder, midfielder and winger on that side.

Brazil would have to shift their midfield diamond from the middle to the flank, and Douglas Santos would have to choose between jumping out to press the ball or protecting the space in behind - a dilemma that always creates room.

That is exactly the gap Japan could exploit. Building with three centre-backs, the Japanese will naturally hold a numerical advantage against Brazil's two strikers. In Hajime Moriyasu's 3-4-2-1, the centre-backs are very capable on the ball at passing and, above all, carrying. And that could trigger a major domino effect in the Brazilian defence.

If Brazil press high, they will be at a numerical disadvantage against the centre-backs and will need to bring one of the midfielders up. By leaving his position, that midfielder opens up space behind the first line of pressing that could be occupied by a holding midfielder or by one of the attacking midfielders dropping back, both of whom will be crucial in this matchup.

With the diamond, the Selecao will have two strikers to defend against three Japanese centre-backs but three midfielders to defend against two holding midfielders. The natural move is for one of those midfielders to push up, then creating numerical parity.

But Japan have two attacking midfielders between the lines in Casemiro's zone, leaving him at a disadvantage. And if one of those midfielders drops into the holding midfielder line, it is now the Brazilian midfield that is short of numbers.

More than that, the Asian wing-backs are quick and hard-working wingers, but skilful on the ball. It is possible that, even if the three centre-backs are pressed individually in equal numbers, one wing-back drops to create numerical superiority and provide the wide option, which is naturally unprotected in Brazil's defensive system.

It is hard to imagine Ancelotti subjecting his team to man-marking and long chases. Precisely for that reason, it is hard to think that, if the Japanese winger drops, the Brazilian full-back would track him all over the pitch. And even if he did, that would dismantle the back line and could be another gap for the midfielders to attack and receive long balls.

In the end, the diamond fine-tuned Brazil's attacking and defensive shape against Haiti and Scotland, but it is a matchup of unfavourable individual battles specifically against Japan. Perhaps against the Netherlands, for instance, that issue would not be as glaringly obvious due to the way that team builds up.

The danger against Japan is clear and has different ramifications. Worse still, Brazil have already struggled against opponents building with three at the back and have had two of their poorest displays trying to press those teams - the Japanese themselves and then France. Against Croatia, who also built with three, Brazil chose to defend in a low block and were better for it.

Ancelotti may well change his approach again, return to defending in a 4-4-2 or set Brazil up in mostly deeper blocks. But, in terms of defensive matchups, facing Japan could be a far more uncomfortable test than expected at such an early stage of the World Cup knockout rounds.