How Vincent Kompany revolutionised Bayern Munich with high-risk tactic and surprise Harry Kane role

Former Pep Guardiola defender has transformed the German giants into one of the most daring teams in recent decades in European football

The future is always unclear. Something new can gain momentum without showing its face and surprises can happen. Vincent Kompany's Bayern Munich, however, are paving the way for the future of football.

The German giants have the best attack in European football. They have scored 64 goals in the current season and 41 in just 11 Bundesliga matches. In the top five leagues, only Barcelona come close, with 36 goals in 13 matches. Expanding to the seven main leagues, PSV have a similar but inferior average (3.3 goals per game).

More than the numbers, the way Bayern reach the opposition goal is unusual at the highest level. Kompany has shown himself to be a manager with extremely aggressive and risky ideas - with generally only two players covering the attack, very high up the pitch and six attacking the defensive line.

Yet, curiously, no team has managed to break Bayern Munich's daring 2-2-6. Not even PSG, who were dominated in the Champions League. But what explains the Bavarians' success?

Bayern take relationism from the romantics and place it on a pedestal

The debate about relationism and positional play has been frequent over the past decade. In an era dominated by the latter and with solitary exponents and sporadic successes of the former, Kompany may be the first to transition between the two and have great success with audacity.

On paper, Bayern Munich still line up in a 4-2-3-1 that was the team's flagship for decades. From the side that won the Champions League pre-Guardiola in 2013, to Hansi Flick's machine in 2021. But what happens after the whistle is completely different.

The idea now is to find spaces, regardless of where they are. Position swaps are frequent, centre-backs make runs in behind and Harry Kane went viral with a heat map and a quantity of passes from defence worthy of a defensive midfielder.

This movement is trained, obviously, but happens naturally once the players understand where the space is and where they should go - and consequently, who to cover. The first phase of build-up is initially simple, generally with four players in the defensive line and two central supports. Kimmich, for example, is very important in this model.

As one of the defensive midfielders in the 4-2-3-1, he drops near the centre-backs and generally occupies the right-back position - who, in turn, advances. This creates doubts in the defence:

• Does the opposition pressing system pursue Kimmich and press him?
• If so, space is created for the full-back who advanced through the middle, or the winger who occupied that space (whilst the full-back advanced down the flank).
• If not, Kimmich, an extremely creative and skilful player, has time and space to advance.

And in a football where individual pressing has taken over at the highest level, Bayern use this to pin opposition markers and open space in build-up. When full-backs and midfielders advance, for example, they pull their opponents and free up space in the middle for centre-backs to advance with the ball.

If opponents press high in a mixture of individual and zonal pressing, the Bavarians also invite them to advance to play long balls and take advantage of the physical dominance of players like Kane and Goretzka, or the wingers' pace to be found in behind.

That is why it does not take long for Kompany's team to reach the more advanced areas of the pitch, where things become even more interesting from a tactical point of view.

Kompany's crazy 2-2-6 and why it works

Offensive formations during the last decade have placed more and more players attacking the last line of defence. As teams generally defended with four defenders, formations with five at the front became popular.

From Guardiola's City to Tite's Brazil national team, the vast majority attacked in offensive organisation with something resembling a 2-3-5 or 3-2-5. Over time, opponents began defending with lines of five, and there was no longer numerical superiority. Now, Kompany has popularised the 2-2-6.

However, the structure of the six at the front is so fluid that, in reality, opposition centre-backs have little to do during Bayern's first phases of build-up. Kane and Gnabry drop to help in midfield and leave that space empty - because the team's idea is to have numerical superiority at all moments of the game.

This gives the team several options to interpret the build-up to attack:

• If centre-backs follow their opponents and push up too much, a large space is created for long balls to find the wingers in behind.
• If they do not follow, whoever drops to help in midfield always generates numerical superiority and Bayern have more support to carry the ball forward.
• If a full-back leaves position to follow Kane, for example, the winger is free to receive.

Dividing the pitch as a rule and Guardiola's touch

Kompany's idea is, broadly speaking, to divide entry into the final third in two ways: through the channels and through the middle. And most of the time, Bayern look to advance down the flanks.

Here, there are rules to follow:

• It is mandatory that the side of the pitch always comprises two players - one in width and the other in the half-space.
• Who these players are is irrelevant. Generally, it is a combination of winger and full-back or midfielder. And who is in which position varies by individual preference.
• The main point: these two cannot be in the same passing line. There must always be one wide, close to the touchline and preferably pushing the defence back, and another closer to the middle.

Dividing the pitch this way is something heavily emphasised by Guardiola, who won multiple titles with Kompany at Manchester City. The idea of never having players on the same line on the flanks was not invented by him, but it was something the Catalan always stressed, since his Barcelona days.

Bayern have a tendency to advance down the flanks and, when they are about to enter the final third, flood the central area. The team places many players near the ball on the flank and uses runs in behind from different directions to reach the box.

When Olise receives wide on the right, for example, the full-back attacks the depth through the half-space, Gnabry approaches coming from the middle and one of the defensive midfielders also advances to enter the box. And whilst many players approach the ball side, there are always two responsible for stretching the pitch, staying close to the other touchline.

This prevents the opponent from completely closing the spaces on the ball side - because it would free up space on the other side for a free player. And it allows these players on the other side to exploit spaces in the middle that open up due to overcrowding on the strong side. There are simply too many options to enter the box.

The surprisingly dominant defence

The fact that Bayern are aggressive like few teams in the world with their position swaps and runs in behind would, in theory, make the team compromised in defence. But this could not be further from the truth.

They are the team with the fewest expected goals (xG) conceded from counter-attacks in the Bundesliga. In all five major leagues, their eight goals conceded are only bettered by Arsenal, Como and Roma (six each).

And this defensive excellence comes from intensity in transition.

As soon as they lose possession, Bayern fiercely press the opponent with the ball. This movement is even easier precisely because the team have several players near the ball due to the nature of their attack - and their own defenders are high, facilitating the interception of long balls.

Beyond transition, the defensive organisation phase also maintains the same principles. Bayern press high with individual orientation and do not stick to a specific formation: they pursue their opponents even if it breaks the team's skeleton.

And when they need to defend even deeper, it is not uncommon to see the team with a line of six defenders inside the box, but positioned very curiously: with little width, closing the box and inviting the opponent to play down the flanks.

This means Bayern are always protected in the most dangerous zone (the box and its entrance), and even if the opponent receives with space on the flank, the nearest defender will not be so far away to press him due to the line of six.

If Kompany drew from Guardiola's source in certain attacking actions, the aggressive defending style that is rarely breached also came from the Catalan, who built very solid defensive teams throughout his career - despite not always being remembered for it.

This article was originally published on Trivela.